paper

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice

arXiv:cond-mat/9710096 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.58.69

Abstract

A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques we study the density of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition between the two absorbing state when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.

6 pages including 6 figures

Cited by in corpus (299)