Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
arXiv:1112.6421 · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
arXiv comment14 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ONE
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- A Further Analysis of The Role of Heterogeneity in Coevolutionary Spatial Games
- Detecting and Describing Dynamic Equilibria in Adaptive Networks