Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma
arXiv:0810.0367 · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2009-00160-1
Abstract
We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.
7 pages, 7 figures
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