Cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors
arXiv:0812.3244 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.79.016106
Abstract
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ( and ) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability depending on the payoff difference and also on the type of the neighbor. The strategy adoption probability is reduced by a pre-factor () from the players of type . We consider the competition between two opposite effects when increasing the number of neighbors (, 8, and 24). Within a range of the portion of influential players (type ) the inhomogeneous activity in strategy transfer yields a relevant increase (dependent on ) in the density of cooperators. The noise-dependence of this phenomenon is also discussed by evaluating phase diagrams.
4 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E
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