Steering cooperation: Adversarial attacks on prisoner's dilemma in complex networks
arXiv:2406.19692 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2024.130214
Abstract
This study examines the application of adversarial attack concepts to control the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in complex networks. Specifically, it proposes a simple adversarial attack method that drives players' strategies towards a target state by adding small perturbations to social networks. The proposed method is evaluated on both model and real-world networks. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively promote cooperation with significantly smaller perturbations compared to other techniques. Additionally, this study shows that adversarial attacks can also be useful in inhibiting cooperation (promoting defection). The findings reveal that adversarial attacks on social networks can be potent tools for both promoting and inhibiting cooperation, opening new possibilities for controlling cooperative behavior in social systems while also highlighting potential risks.
arXiv comment19 pages, 4 figures
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