Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Gam
arXiv:2009.12819 · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244814
Abstract
Prisoner's dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. But in many research the assumption that individual's aspiration is fixed is inconsistent with recent results from psychology. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual's aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause cooperator's existence or defector's expansion, and the evolution process for different parameters including strategy and aspiration. As a result, the intrinsic structures leading to defectors' expansion and cooperators' survival are achieved for different evolution process, which provides a penetrating understanding of the evolution. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner's dilemma.
arXiv comment17 pages, 13 figures
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