Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas
arXiv:1412.4113 · doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.1299
Abstract
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behavior in humans and social animals also compel to conformity on their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favor of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.
arXiv comment8 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Society Interface
References in corpus (32)
- Emergence of scaling in random networks
- Statistical physics of social dynamics
- Multilayer Networks
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Coevolutionary games - a mini review
- Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
- Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
- Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
- Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
- Social games in a social network
- Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: A review
- Phase diagrams for Prisoner's Dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices
- Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks
- Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
- Critical Coarsening without Surface Tension: the Voter Universality Class
- Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions
- Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
- Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
- The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games
- Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
- Co-evolutionary games on networks
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation
- Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoners' dilemma game on small-world networks
- Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution
- Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network
- Evolution of extortion in structured populations
- Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour
- Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
- Evolutionary Games defined at the Network Mesoscale: The Public Goods game
- Emergent Hierarchical Structures in Multiadaptive Games
- Partner selections in public goods games with constant group size
Cited by in corpus (36)
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
- Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
- Statistical Physics of the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with Memory-Aware Agents
- Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas
- Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations
- Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment
- Conformity-Driven Agents Support Ordered Phases in the Spatial Public Goods Game
- The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
- Enhancement of cooperation through conformity-driven reproductive ability
- The Role of Noise in the Spatial Public Goods Game
- Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
- Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions
- Evolutionary Dynamics of Group Formation
- Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
- Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players
- A memory-based spatial evolutionary game with the dynamic interaction between learners and profiteers
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching
- A consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game
- Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Facilitating Cooperation in Human-Agent Hybrid Populations through Autonomous Agents
- Effects of updating rules on the coevolving prisoner's dilemma
- Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games
- Interactive diversity disrupts cyclic dominance but maintains cooperation in spatial social dilemma games
- Effects of Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma
- The Host-Pathogen Game: an evolutionary approach to biological competitions
- Mobility driven coexistence of living organisms
- Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Gam
- Quantum games of opinion formation based on the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme
- Emergence of cooperation in a population with bimodal response behaviors
- Catalytic evolution of cooperation in a population with behavioural bimodality
- Perceptual Rationality: An Evolutionary Game Theory of Perceptually Rational Decision-Making
- Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation
- Evolution of cooperation in a bimodal mixture of conditional cooperators
- Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games with Stochastic Opting-Out
- Optimal control of complex networks with conformity behavior