Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

Abstract

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied with an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

10 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics

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Cited by in corpus (1)

• Complex cooperative networks from evolutionary preferential attachment