Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
arXiv:q-bio/0703019 · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/9/6/184
Abstract
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial conditions, in contrast with the behavior of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdos-Renyi graphs and the Barabasi-Albert networks.
18 pages, 6 figures, revised version accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics (2007)
References in corpus (11)
- Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
- Paths to Synchronization on Complex Networks
- Cooperation in noisy case: prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs
- Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics
- Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks
- From Scale-free to Erdos-Renyi Networks
- Prisoners' dilemma in real-world acquaintance networks: Spikes and quasi-equilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics
- Structure of Peer-to-Peer Social Networks
- Prisoner's Dilemma on community networks
- Michaelis-Menten Dynamics in Complex Heterogeneous Networks
- Scale-Free topologies and Activatory-Inhibitory interactions
Cited by in corpus (12)
- Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation
- Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks
- Complex cooperative networks from evolutionary preferential attachment
- Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Social Network Reciprocity as a Phase Transition in Evolutionary Cooperation
- Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas
- Prisoner's dilemma in structured scale-free networks