Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of evolution. Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the Harmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the disappearance of the coexistence state in the Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and in the presence of a background of fitness.

Final version with minor changes, accepted for publication in Physical Review Letters

References in corpus (3)

• Coevolutionary Dynamics: From Finite to Infinite Populations
• Stochastic gain in population dynamics
• Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process

Cited by in corpus (10)

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• Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks
• Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
• Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation
• Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
• Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
• Population size effects in evolutionary dynamics on neutral networks and toy landscapes