Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Abstract

We have studied the impact of time-dependent learning capacities of players in the framework of spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In our model, this capacity of players may decrease or increase in time after strategy adoption according to a step-like function. We investigated both possibilities separately and observed significantly different mechanisms that form the stationary pattern of the system. The time decreasing learning activity helps cooperator domains to recover the possible intrude of defectors hence supports cooperation. In the other case the temporary restrained learning activity generates a cyclic dominance between defector and cooperator strategies, which helps to maintain the diversity of strategies via propagating waves. The results are robust and remain valid by changing payoff values, interaction graphs or functions characterizing time-dependence of learning activity. Our observations suggest that dynamically generated mechanisms may offer alternative ways to keep cooperators alive even at very larger temptation to defect.

7 pages, 6 figures, accepted for publication in Physical Review E

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