Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems

Abstract

The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this work we assume that a specific strategy from the available set is reluctant to adopt alternative states, hence the related learning activity is reduced no matter which other strategy is considered for adoption. Paradoxically, this modification of the basic model will primarily elevate the stationary fraction of another strategy who is the virtual predator of the one with reduced learning activity. This general reaction of the studied systems is in agreement with our understanding about Lotka-Volterra type cyclic dominant systems where lowering the invasion rate between a source and target species promotes the growth of former population. The observed effect is highly non-linear because the effective invasion rates between strategies may depend sensitively on the details of the actual model.

arXiv comment9 two-column pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals

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• Evolution of cooperation under a generalized death-birth process
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• Competition among alliances of different sizes
• Oscillatory cooperation prevalence emerges from misperception
• Constructive agents nullify the ability of destructive agents to foster cooperation in public goods games
• The survival of the weakest in a biased donation game