From pairwise to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance

Abstract

We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each potential invasion stem from a single pairwise interaction. However, the transformation of invasion rates to payoffs also allows the usage of larger interaction ranges. In addition to the traditional pairwise interaction, we therefore consider simultaneous interactions with all nearest neighbors, as well as with all nearest and next-nearest neighbors, thus effectively going from single pair to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance. We show that differences in the interaction range affect not only the stationary fractions of strategies, but also their relations of dominance. The transition from pairwise to group interactions can thus decelerate and even revert the direction of the invasion between the competing strategies. Like in evolutionary social dilemmas, in games of cyclic dominance too the indirect multipoint interactions that are due to group interactions hence play a pivotal role. Our results indicate that, in addition to the invasion rates, the interaction range is at least as important for the maintenance of biodiversity among cyclically competing strategies.

arXiv comment7 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E

References in corpus (31)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
• Mobility promotes and jeopardizes biodiversity in rock-paper-scissors games
• Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Topology independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool-punishment
• Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
• Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks
• Coexistence versus extinction in the stochastic cyclic Lotka-Volterra model
• Noise and Correlations in a Spatial Population Model with Cyclic Competition
• Oscillatory Dynamics in Rock-Paper-Scissors Games with Mutations
• Cyclical interactions with alliance-specific heterogeneous invasion rates
• Zero-one survival behavior of cyclically competing species
• Instability of spatial patterns and its ambiguous impact on species diversity
• Spatial Rock-Paper-Scissors Models with Inhomogeneous Reaction Rates
• Junctions and spiral patterns in Rock-Paper-Scissors type models
• Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Fluctuations and Correlations in Lattice Models for Predator-Prey Interaction
• Diverging fluctuations in a spatial five-species cyclic dominance game
• Effects of competition on pattern formation in the rock-paper-scissors game
• Von-Neumann's and related scaling laws in Rock-Paper-Scissors type models
• Cyclic competition of four species: domains and interfaces
• Ecosystems with mutually exclusive interactions self-organize to a state of high diversity
• Phase transitions induced by variation of invasion rates in spatial cyclic predator-prey models with four or six species
• Interplay between partnership formation and competition in generalized May-Leonard games
• Interfaces with internal structures in generalized rock-paper-scissors models
• Vortex dynamics in a three-state model under cyclic dominance
• Labyrinthine clustering in a spatial rock-paper-scissors ecosystem
• Clonal selection prevents tragedy of the commons when neighbors compete in a rock-paper-scissors game
• Stability and robustness analysis of cooperation cycles driven by destructive agents in finite populations
• Oscillations and patterns in interacting populations of two species

Cited by in corpus (21)

• Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: A review
• Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
• Zealots tame oscillations in the spatial rock-paper-scissors game
• Pattern formations driven by cyclic interactions: a brief review of recent developments
• Strategy dependent learning activity in cyclic dominant systems
• A novel procedure for the identification of chaos in complex biological systems
• Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
• Aggregation as an antipredator strategy in the rock-paper-scissors model
• Hamming distance and mobility behavior in generalized rock-paper-scissors models
• Non-Hermitian topology in rock-paper-scissors games
• Coevolutionary dynamics of a variant of the cyclic Lotka-Volterra model with three-agent interactions
• Influence of the neighborhood on cyclic models of biodiversity
• Phase transitions in dependence of apex predator decaying ratio in a cyclic dominant system
• How multiple weak species jeopardise biodiversity in spatial rock-paper-scissors models
• Equal partners do better in defensive alliances
• Single Equalizer Strategy with no Information Transfer for Conflict Escalation
• Social dilemmas in off-lattice populations
• Resurgence of oscillation in coupled oscillators under delayed cyclic interaction
• Locally adaptive aggregation of organisms under death risk in rock-paper-scissors models
• Spatial patterns and biodiversity in rock-paper-scissors models with regional unevenness
• An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion