Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
arXiv:1301.2247 · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997
Abstract
Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and nonliving matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class, representative of which is the public goods game. In addition, methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organisation in evolutionary games. Here we review recent advances in the study of evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations, including lattices, complex networks and coevolutionary models. We also compare these results with those obtained on well-mixed populations. The review particularly highlights that the study of the dynamics of group interactions, like several other important equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamical processes in biological, economical and social sciences, benefits from the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.
17 two-column pages, 13 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Society Interface
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