Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
arXiv:1907.10989 · doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.104914
Abstract
Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strategy which is able to promote cooperation at a reasonable cost. However, thus far few works have explored the optimal institutional incentives which minimize related cost for the benefit of public cooperation. In this work, in combination with optimal control theory we thus formulate two optimal control problems to explore the optimal incentive strategies for institutional reward and punishment respectively. By using the approach of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for well-mixed populations, we theoretically obtain the optimal positive and negative incentive strategies with the minimal cumulative cost respectively. Additionally, we provide numerical examples to verify that the obtained optimal incentives allow the dynamical system to reach the desired destination at the lowest cumulative cost in comparison with other given incentive strategies. Furthermore, we find that the optimal punishing strategy is a cheaper way for obtaining an expected cooperation level when it is compared with the optimal rewarding strategy.
arXiv commentCommunications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, Volume 79, December 2019, Article 104914
References in corpus (14)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
- Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
- Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool-punishment
- Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: Phase transitions to elementary strategies
- Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games
- Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
- Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
- Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
- Punishment in Public Goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas
Cited by in corpus (14)
- An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics
- Cost efficiency of institutional incentives in finite populations
- Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations
- Mediating Artificial Intelligence Developments through Negative and Positive Incentives
- Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
- The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
- Social Diversity Reduces the Complexity and Cost of Fostering Fairness
- Group-size dependent synergy in heterogeneous populations
- Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions
- Pinning control of social fairness in the Ultimatum game
- Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations
- Evolution of Coordination in Pairwise and Multi-player Interactions via Prior Commitments
- Revisiting institutional punishment in the -person prisoner's dilemma
- Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons