An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Abstract

During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to curb viral spreading. Such actions can reduce the number of simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be suggested, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the disease risk. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated, avoiding unnecessary contacts. With this motivation, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory to take into account dynamic individual quarantine strategies, intending to combine in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. The disease spreads in a population whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent's health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent's strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Results show recurrent infection waves, which were seen in previous epidemic scenarios with quarantine. Notably, the risk perception is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.

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• Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
• Optimal rewiring in coupled opinion and epidemic dynamics with vaccination
• Criticality and Griffiths phases in random games with quenched disorder
• The Co-evolution of Cooperation and Epidemic Spreading
• Anomalous behavior of Replicator dynamics for the Prisoner's Dilemma on diluted lattices
• The effect of delayed awareness and fatigue on the efficacy of self-isolation in epidemic control