Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

Abstract

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor $w$ characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations $\nu$ at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of $w$ and $\nu$ for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.

4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typos

References in corpus (2)

• Prisoners' dilemma in real-world acquaintance networks: Spikes and quasi-equilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics
• Stochastic gain in population dynamics

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