Cooperation enhanced by the difference between interaction and learning neighborhoods for evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Abstract

We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy adoption (learning) mechanism. This system is investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation method. We consider the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for a fixed interaction graph, while varying the number of edges in the learning graph. According to the Monte Carlo simulations, the cooperation is modified substantially in a way resembling a coherence-resonance-like behavior when the number of learning edges is increased. This behavior is reproduced by the analytical results.

8 pages, 5 figures

References in corpus (3)

• Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
• Randomness enhances cooperation: a resonance type phenomenon in evolutionary games
• Stochastic gain in population dynamics

Cited by in corpus (6)

• Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
• Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
• Cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors
• Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma
• Promote cooperation by localised small-world communication