Stochastic gain in population dynamics
arXiv:cond-mat/0402647 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.028701
Abstract
We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates. We show that a population with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and can also exploit external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a reasonance-like fashion. The payoff versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance. Seen in this broad context, we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to improve properties of the system. Such a mechanism could be of particular interest in economic systems.
accepted for publication in Phys. Rev. Lett
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Cited by in corpus (22)
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