Unfair and Anomalous Evolutionary Dynamics from Fluctuating Payoffs

Abstract

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be "unfair", meaning that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an unexpected selection reversal in the Hawk-Dove game.

arXiv comment6 pages, 8 pages supplement

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Cited by in corpus (9)

• Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations
• Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception
• Cooperation dynamics in the networked geometric Brownian motion
• Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments
• Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection
• Criticality and Griffiths phases in random games with quenched disorder
• Emergence of synergistic and competitive pathogens in a co-evolutionary spreading mode
• Evolution of cooperation in networked heterogeneous fluctuating environments
• Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity on complex networks