Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games
arXiv:2102.09452 · doi:10.1063/5.0032311
Abstract
This paper is concerned with exploring the microscopic basis for the discrete versions of the standard replicator equation and the adjusted replicator equation. To this end, we introduce frequency-dependent selection -- as a result of competition fashioned by game-theoretic consideration -- into the Wright--Fisher process, a stochastic birth-death process. The process is further considered to be active in a generation-wise nonoverlapping finite population where individuals play a two-strategy bimatrix population game. Subsequently, connections among the corresponding master equation, the Fokker--Planck equation, and the Langevin equation are exploited to arrive at the deterministic discrete replicator maps in the limit of infinite population size.
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