Asymmetric evolutionary games

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.

accepted for publication in PLOS Comp. Biol

References in corpus (6)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
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• Cooperation in noisy case: prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs
• Universality of weak selection
• Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Populations with Heterogeneous Structures
• Environmental Evolutionary Graph Theory

Cited by in corpus (16)

• Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
• Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
• Generalized Lotka-Volterra equations with random, non-reciprocal interactions: the typical number of equilibria
• Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity
• Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
• Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
• Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory
• Structural symmetry in evolutionary games
• Cooperation dynamics in the networked geometric Brownian motion
• Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games
• Adaptive Payoff-driven Interaction in Networked Snowdrift Games
• General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics
• Complex Pathways to Cooperation Emergent from Asymmetry in Heterogeneous Populations
• Evolution of cooperation with Q-learning: the impact of information perception
• An Analysis of the Replicator Dynamics for an Asymmetric Hawk-Dove Game
• Stochastic selection processes