activity
20112026
most citedEvolutionary dynamics with game transitions

170 citations · 1.1k across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

34 papers

physics.soc-ph2026

Hyperedge approximation for stochastic processes on higher-order networks

Anzhi Sheng, Alex McAvoy, Ye Tian +3

Graphs are a standard framework for describing dynamical processes shaped by pairwise interactions among agents. But many systems involve interactions in groups of three or more ag…

q-bio.PE2026

Meeting times on graphs in near-cubic time

Alex McAvoy

The expected meeting time of two random walkers on an undirected graph of size , where at each time step one walker moves and the process stops when they collide, satisfies a sy…

econ.TH2025★ 1 cited

Expectation-enforcing strategies for repeated games

Nikos Dimou, Alex McAvoy

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. A…

cs.CY2025

PropensityBench: Evaluating Latent Safety Risks in Large Language Models via an Agentic Approach

Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Shayan Shabihi, Alex McAvoy +4

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current…

physics.soc-ph2025★ 3 cited

Behavioral alignment in social networks

Yu Xia, Alex McAvoy, Qi Su

The orderly behaviors observed in large-scale groups, such as fish schooling and the organized movement of crowds, are both ubiquitous and essential for the survival and stability…

physics.soc-ph2024

Promoting collective cooperation through temporal interactions

Yao Meng, Alex McAvoy, Aming Li

Collective cooperation drives the dynamics of many natural, social, and economic phenomena, making understanding the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary game theory a centra…

q-bio.PE2024★ 12 cited

Frequency-dependent returns in nonlinear public goods games

Christoph Hauert, Alex McAvoy

When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modeled using the framework of public goods games. These models often assume that the return of t…

physics.soc-ph2023

Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory

Nikoleta E. Glynatsi, Alex McAvoy, Christian Hilbe

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to this literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally…

physics.soc-ph2023

Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information

Xiaochen Wang, Lei Zhou, Alex McAvoy +1

Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to th…

physics.soc-ph2023

Strategy evolution on temporal hypergraphs

Xiaochen Wang, Lei Zhou, Alex McAvoy +2

Individuals interact and cooperate in structured systems. Many studies represent this structure using static networks, where each link represents a permanent connection between two…

physics.soc-ph2023★ 90 cited

Strategy evolution on dynamic networks

Qi Su, Alex McAvoy, Joshua B. Plotkin

Models of strategy evolution on static networks help us understand how population structure can promote the spread of traits like cooperation. One key mechanism is the formation of…

cs.GT2021★ 2 cited

Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games

Arjun Mirani, Alex McAvoy

In iterated games, a player can unilaterally exert influence over the outcome through a careful choice of strategy. A powerful class of such "payoff control" strategies was discove…

q-bio.PE2021★ 6 cited

Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations

Alex McAvoy, Yoichiro Mori, Joshua B. Plotkin

A selfish learner seeks to maximize their own success, disregarding others. When success is measured as payoff in a game played against another learner, mutual selfishness typicall…

q-bio.PE2021★ 24 cited

Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games

Alex McAvoy, Julian Kates-Harbeck, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what in…

q-bio.PE2020★ 25 cited

Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory

Alex McAvoy, John Wakeley

In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly-heterogeneous spat…

physics.soc-ph2020★ 133 cited

Evolution of prosocial behavior in multilayer populations

Qi Su, Alex McAvoy, Yoichiro Mori +1

Human societies include diverse social relationships. Friends, family, business colleagues, and online contacts can all contribute to one's social life. Individuals may behave diff…

q-bio.PE2020★ 8 cited

The Moran process on 2-chromatic graphs

Kamran Kaveh, Alex McAvoy, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1

Resources are rarely distributed uniformly within a population. Heterogeneity in the concentration of a drug, the quality of breeding sites, or wealth can all affect evolutionary d…

q-bio.PE2019★ 95 cited

Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies

Alex McAvoy, Benjamin Allen, Martin A. Nowak

Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure…

q-bio.PE2019★ 80 cited

Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection

Alex McAvoy, Benjamin Allen

In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait's success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This "fi…

q-bio.PE2019★ 170 cited

Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

Qi Su, Alex McAvoy, Long Wang +1

The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nat…

q-bio.PE2019★ 15 cited

Reactive learning strategies for iterated games

Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other p…

q-bio.PE2018★ 10 cited

Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure

Alex McAvoy, Ben Adlam, Benjamin Allen +1

We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types ("trai…

q-bio.PE2018★ 113 cited

Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Christoph Hauert, Camille Saade, Alex McAvoy

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, w…

q-bio.PE2018★ 41 cited

A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure

Benjamin Allen, Alex McAvoy

We define a general class of models representing natural selection between two alleles. The population size and spatial structure are arbitrary, but fixed. Genetics can be haploid,…