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20112026
most citedEvolutionary dynamics with game transitions

170 citations · 1.1k across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

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22 papers · 1 filter

q-bio.PE2026

Meeting times on graphs in near-cubic time

Alex McAvoy

The expected meeting time of two random walkers on an undirected graph of size , where at each time step one walker moves and the process stops when they collide, satisfies a sy…

q-bio.PE2024★ 12 cited

Frequency-dependent returns in nonlinear public goods games

Christoph Hauert, Alex McAvoy

When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modeled using the framework of public goods games. These models often assume that the return of t…

q-bio.PE2021★ 6 cited

Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations

Alex McAvoy, Yoichiro Mori, Joshua B. Plotkin

A selfish learner seeks to maximize their own success, disregarding others. When success is measured as payoff in a game played against another learner, mutual selfishness typicall…

q-bio.PE2021★ 24 cited

Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games

Alex McAvoy, Julian Kates-Harbeck, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what in…

q-bio.PE2020★ 25 cited

Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory

Alex McAvoy, John Wakeley

In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly-heterogeneous spat…

q-bio.PE2020★ 8 cited

The Moran process on 2-chromatic graphs

Kamran Kaveh, Alex McAvoy, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1

Resources are rarely distributed uniformly within a population. Heterogeneity in the concentration of a drug, the quality of breeding sites, or wealth can all affect evolutionary d…

q-bio.PE2019★ 95 cited

Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies

Alex McAvoy, Benjamin Allen, Martin A. Nowak

Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure…

q-bio.PE2019★ 80 cited

Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection

Alex McAvoy, Benjamin Allen

In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait's success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This "fi…

q-bio.PE2019★ 170 cited

Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

Qi Su, Alex McAvoy, Long Wang +1

The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nat…

q-bio.PE2019★ 15 cited

Reactive learning strategies for iterated games

Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other p…

q-bio.PE2018★ 10 cited

Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure

Alex McAvoy, Ben Adlam, Benjamin Allen +1

We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types ("trai…

q-bio.PE2018★ 113 cited

Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Christoph Hauert, Camille Saade, Alex McAvoy

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, w…

q-bio.PE2018★ 41 cited

A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure

Benjamin Allen, Alex McAvoy

We define a general class of models representing natural selection between two alleles. The population size and spatial structure are arbitrary, but fixed. Genetics can be haploid,…

q-bio.PE2017★ 37 cited

Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size

Alex McAvoy, Nicolas Fraiman, Christoph Hauert +2

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. H…

q-bio.PE2017★ 14 cited

Environmental fitness heterogeneity in the Moran process

Kamran Kaveh, Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

Many mathematical models of evolution assume that all individuals experience the same environment. Here, we study the Moran process in heterogeneous environments. The population is…

q-bio.PE2017

Effects of motion in structured populations

Madison S. Krieger, Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

In evolutionary processes, population structure has a substantial effect on natural selection. Here, we analyze how motion of individuals affects constant selection in structured p…

q-bio.PE2016★ 1 cited

Fixation probabilities for any configuration of two strategies on regular graphs

Yu-Ting Chen, Alex McAvoy, Martin A. Nowak

Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evolutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure can promote t…

q-bio.PE2016★ 38 cited

Autocratic strategies for alternating games

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over re…

q-bio.PE2015★ 1 cited

Stochastic selection processes

Alex McAvoy

We propose a mathematical framework for natural selection in finite populations. Traditionally, many of the selection-based processes used to describe cultural and genetic evolutio…

q-bio.PE2015★ 86 cited

Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral contro…

q-bio.PE2015★ 25 cited

Structural symmetry in evolutionary games

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies…

q-bio.PE2015★ 90 cited

Asymmetric evolutionary games

Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interacti…