Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size

Abstract

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural feature of such a model that cooperators enable survival, while defectors drive extinction. Although defectors are favored for any mixed population, random drift could lead to their elimination and the resulting pure-cooperator population could survive. On the other hand, if the defectors remain, then the population will quickly go extinct because the frequency of cooperators steadily declines and defectors alone cannot survive. In a mutation-selection model, we find that (i) a steady supply of cooperators can enable long-term population survival, provided selection is sufficiently strong, and (ii) selection can increase the abundance of cooperators but reduce their relative frequency. Thus, evolutionary game dynamics in populations with variable size generate a multifaceted notion of what constitutes a trait's long-term success.

21 pages; final version

References in corpus (14)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure
• Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space
• Universality of weak selection
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
• Demographic noise can reverse the direction of deterministic selection
• Evolutionary game theory in growing populations
• The branching process with logistic growth
• Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Population Genetics with Fluctuating Population Sizes
• Frequency-dependent fitness induces multistability in coevolutionary dynamics
• Effects of population growth on the success of invading mutants

Cited by in corpus (8)

• A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources
• Turbulent coherent structures and early life below the Kolmogorov scale
• Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure
• Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection
• Altruism in populations at the extinction transition
• The cooperation-defection evolution on social networks