Spatial interactions and oscillatory tragedies of the commons

Abstract

A tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs when individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete commonly-held resources, leading to a worse outcome than had they cooperated. Over time, the depletion of resources can change incentives for subsequent actions. Here, we investigate long-term feedback between game and environment across a continuum of incentives in an individual-based framework. We identify payoff-dependent transition rules that lead to oscillatory TOC-s in stochastic simulations and the mean field limit. Further extending the stochastic model, we find that spatially explicit interactions can lead to emergent, localized dynamics, including the propagation of cooperative wave fronts and cluster formation of both social context and resources. These dynamics suggest new mechanisms underlying how TOCs arise and how they might be averted.

arXiv comment5 pages and 3 figures in main text, 9 pages and 4 figures in supplementary material

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• Game-environment feedback dynamics in growing population: Effect of finite carrying capacity
• Hostility prevents the tragedy of the commons in metapopulation with asymmetric migration: A lesson from queenless ants