Cooperators overcome migration dilemma through synchronization
arXiv:2102.10041 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevResearch.3.013009
Abstract
Synchronization, cooperation, and chaos are ubiquitous phenomena in nature. In a population composed of many distinct groups of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game, there exists a migration dilemma: No cooperator would migrate to a group playing the prisoner's dilemma game lest it should be exploited by a defector; but unless the migration takes place, there is no chance of the entire population's cooperator-fraction to increase. Employing a randomly rewired coupled map lattice of chaotic replicator maps, modelling replication-selection evolutionary game dynamics, we demonstrate that the cooperators -- evolving in synchrony -- overcome the migration dilemma to proliferate across the population when altruism is mildly incentivized making few of the demes play the leader game.
12 pages, 8 figures
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