Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial Prisoner's dilemma

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temptation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark contrast to the otherwise case, where cooperation is promoted for intermediate aspiration level with synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable cooperators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.

arXiv comment7 pages, 4 figures, all comments are welcomed

References in corpus (23)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Coevolutionary games - a mini review
• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice
• Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
• Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
• Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations
• Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
• Phase diagrams for Prisoner's Dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices
• Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
• Cooperation in noisy case: prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs
• Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
• The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games
• From extortion to generosity, the evolution of zero-determinant strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strategies demonstrates that winning isn't everything
• Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma
• Evolution of extortion in structured populations
• Role of aspiration-induced migration in cooperation
• Emergent Hierarchical Structures in Multiadaptive Games
• Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
• Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Cooperation enhanced by the difference between interaction and learning neighborhoods for evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors
• Cooperation, structure and hierarchy in multiadaptive games

Cited by in corpus (13)

• Extortion under Uncertainty: Zero-Determinant Strategies in Noisy Games
• Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games
• Enhancement of cooperation through conformity-driven reproductive ability
• Recovery rate affects the effective epidemic threshold with synchronous updating
• Emergence of Cooperation in Two-agent Repeated Games with Reinforcement Learning
• Satisfied-defect, unsatisfied-cooperate: An evolutionary dynamics of cooperation led by aspiration
• Emergence of Exploitation as Symmetry Breaking in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Impact of Committed Minorities: Unveiling Critical Mass of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Single Equalizer Strategy with no Information Transfer for Conflict Escalation
• Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
• Oscillatory evolution of collective behavior in evolutionary games played with reinforcement learning
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game