Satisfied-defect, unsatisfied-cooperate: An evolutionary dynamics of cooperation led by aspiration
arXiv:1808.09957 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.98.062113
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent behavioral experiments are not compatible with the predictions based on the imitation dynamics, casting doubts on the assumption of the imitation-led updates and calling for alternative mechanisms of strategy updates. An aspiration-led update is often considered as an alternative to the imitation-led one. While details of update rules can have significant impacts on the evolutionary outcomes and many variations in imitation-led updates are thus studied, however, few variations exist in aspiration-led updates. We introduce an aspiration-led update mechanism ("Satisfied-Defect, Unsatisfied-Cooperate") that is psychologically intuitive and can yield a behavior richer than the conventional aspiration-led update does in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Using analytical and numerical methods, we study and link the stochastic dynamics of it in well-mixed finite populations and the deterministic dynamics of infinite populations.
arXiv comment13 pages, 10 figures, and 3 tables
References in corpus (12)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Phase diagrams for Prisoner's Dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices
- Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
- Aspiration Dynamics of Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
- Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games
- Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas
- Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial Prisoner's dilemma
- Learning dynamics explains human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks
- Social imitation vs strategic choice, or consensus vs cooperation in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma
- Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth
- On the Origin of Risk Sensitivity: the Energy Budget Rule Revisited
- Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas