Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth
arXiv:1403.1572 · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/105/48001
Abstract
Natural selection favors the more successful individuals. This is the elementary premise that pervades common models of evolution. Under extreme conditions, however, the process may no longer be probabilistic. Those that meet certain conditions survive and may reproduce while others perish. By introducing the corresponding binary birth-death dynamics to spatial evolutionary games, we observe solutions that are fundamentally different from those reported previously based on imitation dynamics. Social dilemmas transform to collective enterprises, where the availability of free expansion ranges and limited exploitation possibilities dictates self-organized growth. Strategies that dominate are those that are collectively most apt in meeting the survival threshold, rather than those who succeed in exploiting others for unfair benefits. Revisiting Darwinian principles with the focus on survival rather than imitation thus reveals the most counterintuitive ways of reconciling cooperation with competition.
arXiv comment6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Europhysics Letters
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