Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
arXiv:0908.1855 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.80.036106
Abstract
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversity of reproduction timescales.
7 pages, 8 figures
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