The world of strategies with memory

Abstract

As part of a generalized "prisoners' dilemma", is considered that the evolution of a population with a full set of behavioral strategies limited only by the depth of memory. Each subsequent generation of the population successively loses the most disadvantageous strategies of behavior of the previous generation. It is shown that an increase in memory in a population is evolutionarily beneficial. The winners of evolutionary selection invariably refer to agents with maximum memory. The concept of strategy complexity is introduced. It is shown that strategies that win in natural selection have maximum or near maximum complexity. Despite the fact that at a separate stage of evolution, according to the payout matrix, the individual gain, while refusing to cooperate, exceeded the gain obtained while cooperating. The winning strategies always belonged to the so-called respectable strategies that are clearly prone to cooperation.

27 pages, 19 figures

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