Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract

We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the past, is one time step, an equilibrium can be achieved as cooperating strategies dominate the whole population via proliferation of tit-for-tat. Extending the time horizon, we filter out poor strategies by simplified replicator dynamics and observe a similar evolutionary pattern to reach the cooperating equilibrium. In particular, the rise of a modified tit-for-tat strategy plays a central role, which implies how a robust strategy is adopted when provided with an enhanced memory capacity.

9 pages, 14 figures

References in corpus (4)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
• Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics
• Prisoners' dilemma in real-world acquaintance networks: Spikes and quasi-equilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics

Cited by in corpus (7)

• Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas
• Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
• Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
• Network Structures between Strategies in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma Games
• The world of strategies with memory
• Dynamic Motifs of Strategies in Prisoner's Dilemma Games