Five rules for friendly rivalry in direct reciprocity

Abstract

Direct reciprocity is one of the key mechanisms accounting for cooperation in our social life. According to recent understanding, most of classical strategies for direct reciprocity fall into one of two classes, `partners' or `rivals'. A `partner' is a generous strategy achieving mutual cooperation, and a `rival' never lets the co-player become better off. They have different working conditions: For example, partners show good performance in a large population, whereas rivals do in head-to-head matches. By means of exhaustive enumeration, we demonstrate the existence of strategies that act as both partners and rivals. Among them, we focus on a human-interpretable strategy, named `CAPRI' after its five characteristic ingredients, i.e., cooperate, accept, punish, recover, and defect otherwise. Our evolutionary simulation shows excellent performance of CAPRI in a broad range of environmental conditions.

arXiv comment21 pages, 8 figures

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Cited by in corpus (13)

• Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations
• Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games
• Emergence of Cooperation in Two-agent Repeated Games with Reinforcement Learning
• Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations
• Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
• Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated $n$-person public-goods game
• Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity
• Unbeatable Tit-for-Tat as a Zero-Determinant Strategy
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs
• Unexploitable games and unbeatable strategies