Zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas

Abstract

Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of the powerful class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here, we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multiplayer social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average. We use this theory to explore how individuals can enhance their strategic options by forming alliances. The effects of an alliance depend on the size of the alliance, the type of the social dilemma, and on the strategy of the allies: fair alliances reduce the inequality within their group; extortionate alliances outperform the remaining group members; but generous alliances increase welfare. Our results highlight the critical interplay of individual control and alliance formation to succeed in large groups.

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