Promoting Cooperation in the Public Goods Game using Artificial Intelligent Agents

Abstract

The tragedy of the commons illustrates a fundamental social dilemma where individual rational actions lead to collectively undesired outcomes, threatening the sustainability of shared resources. Strategies to escape this dilemma, however, are in short supply. In this study, we explore how artificial intelligence (AI) agents can be leveraged to enhance cooperation in public goods games, moving beyond traditional regulatory approaches to using AI as facilitators of cooperation. We investigate three scenarios: (1) Mandatory Cooperation Policy for AI Agents, where AI agents are institutionally mandated always to cooperate; (2) Player-Controlled Agent Cooperation Policy, where players evolve control over AI agents' likelihood to cooperate; and (3) Agents Mimic Players, where AI agents copy the behavior of players. Using a computational evolutionary model with a population of agents playing public goods games, we find that only when AI agents mimic player behavior does the critical synergy threshold for cooperation decrease, effectively resolving the dilemma. This suggests that we can leverage AI to promote collective well-being in societal dilemmas by designing AI agents to mimic human players.

16 pages, 6 figures

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