Linear algebraic structure of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games

Abstract

Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of players. Although existence and evolutional stability of ZD strategies have been studied in simple games, their mathematical properties have not been well-known yet. For example, what happens when more than one players employ ZD strategies have not been clarified. In this paper, we provide a general framework for investigating situations where more than one players employ ZD strategies in terms of linear algebra. First, we theoretically prove that a set of linear relations of average payoffs enforced by ZD strategies always has solutions, which implies that incompatible linear relations are impossible. Second, we prove that linear payoff relations are independent of each other under some conditions. These results hold for general games with public monitoring including perfect-monitoring games. Furthermore, we provide a simple example of a two-player game in which one player can simultaneously enforce two linear relations, that is, simultaneously control her and her opponent's average payoffs. All of these results elucidate general mathematical properties of ZD strategies.

arXiv comment19 pages, 2 figures

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• Unbeatable Tit-for-Tat as a Zero-Determinant Strategy
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
• On the implementation of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games
• Unexploitable games and unbeatable strategies
• Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
• Zero-determinant strategies in repeated continuously-relaxed games