Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games

Abstract

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.

arXiv comment2 pages

References in corpus (2)

• Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
• Linear algebraic structure of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games

Cited by in corpus (7)

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• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Unbeatable Tit-for-Tat as a Zero-Determinant Strategy
• Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
• On the implementation of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games
• Unexploitable games and unbeatable strategies