Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated $n$-person public-goods game

Abstract

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a `friendly-rivalry' strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated $n$-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous $m=2n-1$ rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for $n=2$ inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when $n=2$ and $3$.

arXiv comment19 pages, 6 figures

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Cited by in corpus (4)

• Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations
• Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
• Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity
• Unexploitable games and unbeatable strategies