Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions

Abstract

We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We find that the stronger the bias in the utility function, the higher the level of public cooperation. Yet the benefits of enhanced public cooperation on the two networks are just as biased as the utility functions themselves. While cooperation may thrive on one network, the other may still be plagued by defectors. Nevertheless, the aggregate level of cooperation on both networks is higher than the one attainable on an isolated network. This positive effect of biased utility functions is due to the suppressed feedback of individual success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales of the evolutionary process on the two interdependent networks. As a result, cooperation is promoted because the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive to the slowing down than the build-up of collective efforts in sizable groups.

6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Europhysics Letters

References in corpus (17)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
• Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
• Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
• Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
• Complex cooperative networks from evolutionary preferential attachment
• Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack
• Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics
• Randomness enhances cooperation: a resonance type phenomenon in evolutionary games
• Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
• Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
• Effects of inhomogeneous activity of players and noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Disentangling Social and Group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on Complex Networks

Cited by in corpus (52)

• Multilayer Networks
• The structure and dynamics of multilayer networks
• Networks beyond pairwise interactions: structure and dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
• Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
• Social physics
• Evolutionary dynamics of higher-order interactions in social networks
• Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
• Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
• Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation
• Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas
• Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
• Assortativity Decreases the Robustness of Interdependent Networks
• Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
• Collective behavior and evolutionary games - An introduction
• Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
• Successful strategies for competing networks
• Evolution of prosocial behavior in multilayer populations
• Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
• Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks
• Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks
• Probabilistic interconnection between interdependent networks promotes cooperation in the public goods game
• Evolutionary games on simplicial complexes
• Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies
• Noise induced enhancement of network reciprocity in social dilemmas
• Gradual learning supports cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation under tempting conditions
• On the networked architecture of genotype spaces and its critical effects on molecular evolution
• Towards a temporal network analysis of interactive WiFi users
• Cavity-based robustness analysis of interdependent networks: Influences of intranetwork and internetwork degree-degree correlations
• Decelerated invasion and waning moon patterns in public goods games with delayed distribution
• The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
• Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks
• Influence of Reciprocal links in Social Networks
• Influence of trust in the spreading of information
• Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation
• Coevolution of relationship and interaction in cooperative dynamical multiplex networks
• Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• On the evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks
• Facilitators on networks reveal the optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity
• Transportation dynamics on coupled networks with limited bandwidth
• Correlated network of networks enhances robustness against catastrophic failures
• The peloton superorganism and protocooperative behavior
• Multiplex Communities and the Emergence of International Conflict
• Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks
• Symmetry breaking in the prisoner's dilemma on two-layer dynamic multiplex networks
• An evolutionary game with reputation-based imitation-mutation dynamics
• Supervised cooperation on interdependent public goods games
• Relaxation time of the global order parameter on multiplex networks: the role of interlayer coupling in Kuramoto oscillators
• Coevolution of relationship-driven cooperation under recommendation protocol on multiplex networks
• Heterogeneous noise enhances spatial reciprocity
• Resilience of antagonistic networks with regard to the effects of initial failures and degree-degree correlations