Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks
arXiv:1402.5155 · doi:10.1038/srep04436
Abstract
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games - the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game - played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a biased imitation process: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability p, and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 - p. We demonstrate that a small decrease of p from p = 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks, and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.
20 pages, 8 figures
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