Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration
arXiv:1702.08542 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.95.032307
Abstract
"Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions, as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents anti-coordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using different strategy updating protocols, we observe complex spatial patterns in dependence on payoff values that are reminiscent to a honeycomb-like organization, which helps to minimize the negative consequence of the topological frustration. We relate the emergence of these patterns to the microscopic dynamics of the evolutionary process, both by means of mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, we also consider the same evolutionary dynamics on the square lattice, where of course the topological frustration is absent. However, with the deletion of diagonal links of the triangular lattice, we can gradually bridge the gap to the square lattice. Interestingly, in this case the level of cooperation in the system is a direct indicator of the level of topological frustration, thus providing a method to determine frustration levels in an arbitrary interaction network.
9 two-column pages, 9 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E
References in corpus (16)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
- Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
- Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
- Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
- Cooperation in noisy case: prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs
- Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation
- If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation
- Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks
- Segregation process and phase transition in cyclic predator-prey models with even number of species
- Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for pairwise collective strategy updates
- "Antiferromagnetism" in social relations and Bonabeau model