Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
arXiv:0802.2807 · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2008-00099-7
Abstract
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an evolutionary process. For this purpose we employ the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on different complex graphs. Reproduction restrictions can have a facilitative effect on the evolution of cooperation that sets in irrespective of particularities of the interaction network. Indeed, an appropriate fraction of less fertile individuals may lead to full supremacy of cooperators where otherwise defection would be widespread. By studying cooperation levels within the group of individuals having full reproduction capabilities, we reveal that the recent mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is conceptually similar to the one reported previously for scale-free networks. Our results suggest that the diversity in the reproduction capability, related to inherently different attitudes of individuals, can enforce the emergence of cooperative behavior among selfish competitors.
arXiv comment10 pages, 4 figures, to be published in EPJB
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