Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations
arXiv:1410.2598 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.90.032813
Abstract
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.
7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E
References in corpus (14)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
- Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
- Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
- Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
- Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation
- Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
- Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics
- Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
- Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
- Coevolution of strategies and update rules in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks