Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks

Abstract

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.

12 pages, 7 figures. to appear

References in corpus (3)

• A system of mobile agents to model social networks
• Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks
• Prisoners' dilemma in real-world acquaintance networks: Spikes and quasi-equilibria induced by the interplay between structure and dynamics

Cited by in corpus (4)

• Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks
• Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation