Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks
arXiv:physics/0612223 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.73.016132
Abstract
We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population evolutionary dynamics. We find the overall result that cooperation is sometimes inhibited and sometimes enhanced in those network structures, with respect to the mixing population case. The differences are due to different update rules and depend on the gain-to-cost ratio. We analyse and qualitatively explain this behavior by using local topological arguments.
12 pages, 8 figures
Cited by in corpus (12)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation
- Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation
- Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network
- Robustness of Cooperation in the Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on Complex Networks
- Social dilemmas in an online social network: the structure and evolution of cooperation
- Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks
- Promotion of cooperation induced by nonlinear attractive effect in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game
- Promotion of cooperation induced by the interplay between structure and game dynamics