Mutual Trust and Cooperation in the Evolutionary Hawks-Doves Game
arXiv:0909.1962 · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.08.008
Abstract
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.
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