Spatial social dilemmas: dilution, mobility and grouping effects with imitation dynamics
arXiv:1511.07740 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2013.09.032
Abstract
We present an extensive, systematic study of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games on a square lattice under a synchronous, noiseless imitation dynamics. We show that for both the occupancy of the network and the (random) mobility of the agents there are intermediate values that may increase the amount of cooperators in the system and new phases appear. We analytically determine the transition lines between these phases and compare with the mean field prediction and the observed behavior on a square lattice. We point out which are the more relevant microscopic processes that entitle cooperators to invade a population of defectors in the presence of mobility and discuss the universality of these results.
13 pages, 13 figures
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- Moderate immigration may promote a peak of cooperation among natives
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