Symbiotic behaviour in the Public Goods game with altruistic punishment
arXiv:2012.09948 · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110737
Abstract
Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge in behavioural sciences. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive environments. Here, we introduce altruistic punishers in the spatial public goods game. This strategy acts as a cooperator in the absence of defectors, otherwise it will punish all defectors in their vicinity while bearing a cost to do so. We observe three distinct behaviours in our model: i) in the absence of punishers, cooperators (who don't punish defectors) are driven to extinction by defectors for most parameter values; ii) clusters of punishers thrive by sharing the punishment costs when these are low iii) for higher punishment costs, punishers, when alone, are subject to exploitation but in the presence of cooperators can form a symbiotic spatial structure that benefits both. This last observation is our main finding since neither cooperation nor punishment alone can survive the defector strategy in this parameter region and the specificity of the symbiotic spatial configuration shows that lattice topology plays a central role in sustaining cooperation. Results were obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice and subsequently confirmed by a pairwise comparison of different strategies' payoffs in diverse group compositions, leading to a phase diagram of the possible states.
References in corpus (24)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Coevolutionary games - a mini review
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Topology independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool-punishment
- Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
- Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
- Does mobility decrease cooperation?
- Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
- Group-size effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity
- A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
- Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity
- Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation
- Simple property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics: Beyond weak selection
- Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations
- Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception
- Spatial social dilemmas: dilution, mobility and grouping effects with imitation dynamics
- Distinguishing the opponents in the prisoner dilemma in well-mixed populations
- Spatial organization and cyclic dominance in asymmetric predator-prey spatial games
- Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games
- Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long
- Moderate death rates can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation