A reversed form of public goods game: equivalence and difference

Abstract

According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge when participants consider if they claim a common resource but the related cost is covered equally by all group members. The latter establishes a reversed form of the original public goods game (R-PGG). In this work, we show that R-PGG is equivalent to PGG in several circumstances, starting from the traditional analysis, via the evolutionary approach in unstructured populations, to Monte Carlo simulations in structured populations. However, there are also cases when the behavior of R-PGG could be surprisingly different from the outcome of PGG. When the key parameters are heterogeneous, for instance, the results of PGG and R-PGG could be diverse even if we apply the same amplitudes of heterogeneity. We find that the heterogeneity in R-PGG generally impedes cooperation, while the opposite is observed for PGG. These diverse system reactions can be understood if we follow how payoff functions change when introducing heterogeneity in the parameter space. This analysis also reveals the distinct roles of cooperator and defector strategies in the mentioned games. Our observations may hopefully stimulate further research to check the potential differences between PGG and R-PGG due to the alternative complexity of conditions.

arXiv comment30 pages, 11 figures, accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics

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• Competition between self- and other-regarding preferences in resolving social dilemmas
• Punishment in bipartite societies